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Looking Backward, Looking Forward
Past and Future Lives of "The Oven Bird's Song"
DAVID M. ENGEL

ORIGINS AND INFLUENCE S

Out walking in the frozen swkmp one gray day,
I paused and said, "I will turn back from here.
No, I will go on farther - and we shall see."
Robert Frost, "The Wood Pile"

Looking back at an article written some years ago by a younger version of
oneself, it becomes possible to see more clearly the influences that shaped
both the text and the author. As we conduct our scholarly work, we tend to
imagine that we are freely choosing the ideas we pursue and the methods we
employ. We are the agents of our own destiny- or so we tell ourselves as we
move forward in time. But, viewed retrospectively, there is ample evidence to
support a much more contingent, even deterministic, view. The author as
auteur seems less plausible. The text is also - perhaps more significantly written by its intellectual environment, by contemporaneous minds and
scholarly works, by the events of the day, and by the quirks and happenstance
of life. That is how it now appears when I reflect on the origins and influences
of "The OvenBird's Song"' more than thirty years later.
In the late 1970s, I found myself driving through the streets of what I called
"Sander County," a small, predominantly agricultural community in Illinois.
My profound thanks to Mary Nell Trautner for her tireless work in editing this collection of essays.
Thanks for their comments on this chapter go as well to Fred Konefsky and Lynn Mather. Indeed,
the concept for the conference itself was Fred's, one of the countless acts of generosity and
friendship for which he is so well known and appreciated by his colleagues. Thanks to Samantha
Barbas and Anya Bernstein for working with Mary Nell, Fred, and Lynn to make the event
unforgettable. And my profound thanks to all the contributors to this volume for their thoughtful
and provocative observations.
' David M. Engel, "The oven bird's S\)ng: insiders, outsiders, and personal injuries in an
American community," Law 6 Society Review, 18(4) (1984), 551-82.
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I had begun to understand that Sander County was undergoing major social
and economic changes, largely as the result of a new factory that had opened the
county to global flows of people, capital, and economic influence. In the c~urse
of my fieldwork, I identified former litigants who had been involved in different
types of civil cases. I knocked on their doors and tried to learn from them how
they had traveled the path to litigation in the local court and what the results
had been. Later, I also identified and interviewed dozens of "community
observers" -ministers, youth leaders, beauticians, farmers, teachers, funeral
parlor operators, social workers, town council members, insurance adjusters,
lawyers, judges, and many others. I asked them about their perspectives on the
transformations underway in their community, and I solicited examples of
trouble cases that had not necessarily entered the legal system. At the same
time, I spent what seemed like endless days sitting quietly in the back room of
the Sander County courthouse, where I read hundreds of old case files,
extracted from them their stories of local conflict, and constructed a quantitative portrait of the flow of litigation over an extended period of time.
How did all of this happen, and why? What sequence of events led me to
attempt this kind of fieldwork in a small, out-of-the-way American community? I was not alone. I would soon discover that other colleagues who were
then unknown to me - people such as Barbara Yngvesson; Carol
Greenhouse, 3 Frank Munger,4 and Sally Merry5 - were doing similar research
in other parts of the country. Our community-based legal ethnographies were
a product of their time - researchers attempt them less often nowadays. In
retrospect, it seems quite clear that scholarship of this kind is not merely the
result of our conscious choices and decisions. It grows out of the soil in which
it's rooted. It pokes its head above the ground and responds to the intellectual
climate that surrounds it. It turns toward the light that happens to shine at a
particular time and place.
This opportunity to look back at the writing of"The OvenBird's Song" has
helped me to situate it at the confluence of four particularly important influences. First, the field of law and society was emerging as a discipline in its
own right, with an institutional structure and a "canon" that made the study of

•
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Barbara Yngvesson, "Making law at the doorway: the clerk, the court, and the construction of
community in a New England town," Law 6 Society Review, 22(3) (1988), 409-4-B·
Carol J. Greenhouse, Praying for Justice: Faith, Order, and Community in an American Town
(Cornell University Press, 1986).
Frank W. Munger, "Social change and tort litigation: industrialization, accidents, and trial
courts in Southern West Virginia, 1872 to 1940," Buffalo Law Review, 36(1) (1988), 75-118.
Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among WorkingClass Americans (University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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disputes and dispute-processing a central concern. Second, the times being
what they were in the 196os and 1970s, many American law and society
scholars had acquired experience in other countries and cultures. They were
subsequently drawn to studies of their own society that would apply the same
methods and cultural interpretive frameworks that they had developed in nonWestern settings. Third, law and society research had begun to reflect broader
intellectual trends that challenged exclusively positivist interpretations of
social behavior and encouraged interpretivist and social constructionist
perspectives. Fourth, when it comes to scholarly work, the personal is the
professional. We as scholars like to pretend that our ideas, our interests, and
our methods are somehow divorced from events in our private lives - the
places we have been, the people we have befriended, our likes, our dislikes;
our personal styles, and our values. But the writing of"The OvenBird's Song,"
like the production of much scholarship, reflects the intersection of the
author's autobiography with the ideas and intellectual influences of the day.
As I try now to explain the origins of this article, I find myself attempting to
weave these four influences together into a plausible account. No doubt, the
narrative I offer here is itself a product of the same four influences even as
I write it down. Our explanations and self-justifications become part of an
endless regression, frames within frames. But this is the best I can do at this
time and at this stage in my own life, offering a version of events that occurred
many years ago, seen now through the eyes of a person closer to the end than
the beginning of his scholarly career.
In college and, briefly, in graduate school, I had been an American Studies
student. In that sense, it is completely unsurprising that I would later join the
small cohort of law and society scholars in the 1970s who decided to explore
law and conflict in American communities. But in another sense, it was highly
improbable that events in my life should have taken me in this direction.
Circumstances had actually led me to drop out of my graduate program in
American Studies at Yale at the height of the Vietnam war, travel to Thailand
in the Peace Corps, and then, after coming back and finishing law school,
return a second time to Thailand to conduct research on a court and community there. In other words, my first scholarly undertakings had everything to do
with Asia and very little to do with American Studies or, for that matter, with
America. After writing two monographs on Thai law, culture, and history,
however, a somewhat random chain of events led to my first job at the
American Bar Foundation (ABF), where it was assumed that I would focus
primarily on US topics. I felt fortunate indeed to be employed by an institution
that expected nothing more of me than fulltime research and writing - and
which provided substantial resources to carry out my work. I had ample time
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to design my Sander County study, obtain additional funding from the
National Science Foundation, and then launch a multi-year ethnographic
study of an American court and community. But what now seems obvious in
retrospect is that the Sander County study was heavily influenced by my work
in Thailand. I was both surprised and delighted to discover that, in their
aversion to litigiousness and in their nostalgic evocation of a conflict-free
community, the residents of Sander County talked and behaved in so many
respects like the residents of Chiangmai. It is only a slight exaggeration to say
that, in my mind, the farmers of Sander County were Thai villagers in overalls.
As I have said, I was not alone in this circuitous journey. World and
national events had led other law and society scholars of my generation to
spend time abroad and then return home. We came back to see our own
society through new eyes. The familiar really had become strange to many of
us, and we were eager to rediscover American law and culture, drawing on our
experiences in Sweden (Barbara Yngvesson), India (Marc Galanter and
Robert Kidder), Chile (Stewart Macaulay), Kenya (Richard Abel), Brazil
(David Trubek), Israel (Richard Schwartz), Lebanon (Laura Nader), Tanzania
(Sally Falk Moore), and elsewhere. It is unlikely that such large numbers of
sociolegal scholars working on American topics had undergone a prior immersion in a non-US culture in previous eras. Our outlook on American law and
society reflected the shared experience of an entire generation.
But it is also worth asking why so many of us were drawn to "law and
society" as the lens for viewing our culture. What was the unique attraction of
this emerging interdisciplinary field as opposed to the more traditional disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political science, or law? In the 1970s, the
US-based Law & Society Association (LSA) was taking shape. LSA had been
incorporated in 1964, and the first issue of the Law 6 Society Review (LSR)
had been published in 1966 under the editorship of Richard D. (Red)
Schwartz. But the first standalone meeting of LSA, not held in conjunction
.with the annual meeting of another disciplinary organization, occurred a
decade later - in Buffalo in 1975 - and regular annual meetings of the LSA
did not commence until 1978. Thus, LSA attained its formal organizational
identity at the very time that my research in Sander County was underway.
LSA's influence on my work cannot be overstated, and I am quite sure that
other colleagues conducting fieldwork on law in American communities
would say the same thing about their own research.
Sociolegal scholarship had, of course, been around long before the 1970s,
and sociolegal centers and associations had arisen elsewhere in the world -the
Japanese Association of the Sociology of Law, for example, was founded
in 1947. But for US-based scholars in the 1970s, LSA had a unique attraction.
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It was not only interdisciplinary - fostering highly productive conversations
among researchers from many different scholarly backgrounds - but also
comparative. The founding figures included North Americans with extensive
experience abroad and also a group of non-North Americans whose work was
highly influential in the development ofLSA- scholars such as Upendra Baxi,
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Neelan Tiruchelvam, and others.
The most prominent sociolegal research paradigm in the 1970s was "dispute
processing." LSA scholars of that era, regardless of their home disciplines,
shared the assumption that disputes were a universal unit of analysis whose
study would be valid in any place, time, and legal context. In a very significant
way, dispute processing became the foundation on which LSA was built.
From the individual dispute, one could extend the analysis as necessary to
every other aspect of law and culture in order to explain how conflict arose
and was handled, whether within the formal legal system or outside it. Influenced by Llewellyn and Hoebel's classic study of the "trouble case" among the
Cheyenne,6 research on dispute processing in the 196os and 1970s fostered a
vibrant body of theoretical and empirical literature, much of it published in
the pages of LSR.7 This literature shaped the field, and the field shaped those
of us who entered it.
When I first embarked on my own scholarly career, I had no knowledge of
LSA as an organization or the research literature associated with it. If anything,
I fancied myself a historian of Southeast Asia with an interest in the advent of
legal modernity in Thailand. Sheer happenstance led me to the law and
society field. After graduating from law school, I received a fellowship to
return to Thailand, where I had lived for three years as a Peace Corps
volunteer. I planned to spend a postgraduate year in Chiangmai, the historic
northern capital, to document the establishment of Thailand's European-style
court system under King Chulalongkorn in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Before leaving for Thailand, I happened to visit my
I
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Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in
Primitive Jurisprudence (University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).
See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, "A comparative theory of dispute institutions in society," Law 6
Society Review, 8(2) (1973), 217-348; Sally Falk Moore, "Law and social change: the semiautonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study," Law 6 Society Review, 7(4) (1973),
719-46; Marc Galanter, "Why the 'haves' come out ahead: speculations on the limits of
legal change," Law 6 Society Review, 9(1) (1974), 95-16o; Laura Nader anQ Harry F. Todd Jr.
(eds.), The Disputing Process- Law in Ten Societies (Columbia University Press, 1978);
Lynn Mather and Barbara Yngvesson, "Language, audience, and the transformation of
disputes," Law 6 Society Review, 15(3-4) (198o-1), 775-8:1.1; William L. F. Felstiner, Richard
L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The emergence and transformation of disputes: naming, blaming,
claiming... ," Law 6 Society Review, 15(3-4) (198o-1), 631-54.
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cousins, Robin and Jim Magavem, in Buffalo. They shared my love of Southeast
Asia, had lived and worked there themselves, and had even slept on the floor
of my little Peace Corps nouse in southern Thailand. Jim, a valued mentor,
told me about a colleague at the UB law school I should meet. An hour later,
I was sitting in the Magaverns' living room talking with a young law professor
named Marc Galanter, and a new field opened up for me. Marc rattled off
the names of a dozen people I should read and correspond with - people such
as Dan Lev, Rick Abel, Bob Kidder, June Starr, Dave Trubek, and Barry
Hooker. To my amazement, all of them answered my letters- this was before
the age of email, of course. I quickly found myself part of the emerging law
and society network, and there I discovered a set of theories and methods that
helped to explain Thai law and culture much better than anything I had
learned in law school. When I arrived back in Chiangmai and learned that the
historical records I sought did not exist, my grounding in law and society
research prepared me to change my project into a contemporary study of
dispute processing centered in the local court but situated in its cultural
and historical setting - and to combine the analysis of hundreds of case files
with fieldwork interviews.
By the time I began work at the American Bar Foundati on, I considered
myself as much a law and society scholar as a Thailand specialist. The transition from research based in Chiangmai to research based in Sander County
seemed quite natural. As the LSA began to hold annual meetings on a regular
basis, I met other like-minded colleagues with similar personal stories. In
particular, I found myself on panels with two young anthropologists named
Barbara Yngvesson and Carol Greenhouse. All three of us had independently
conducted our own studies of American courts and communities. We soon
realized we were completing one another's sentences and influencing one
another's ideas. Later we decided to write a single book about our three
communities, combining our insights from different regions of the country. 8
Sheer happenstance, but also the result of intellectual and institutional developments beyond our control. Free will or determinism? I'm not sure.
As I began to write about the Sander County research, the intellectual climate
had changed within LSAand in the related disciplines. Originally, I had thought
my aim was to map disputes in Sander County as they emerged from the social
milieu and traveled to different forums, in some cases all the way to the court.
That is what the first draft of "The Oven Bird's Song" looked like. But this
paradigm felt less and less satisfactory as time went on. In the late 1970s and early
8

Carol J. Greenhouse, Barbara Yngvesson, and David M. Engel, Law and Community in Three
American Towns (Cornell University Press, 1994).
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198os, the so-called "interpretive tum" began to change the thinking of many in
the law and society field. The writings of Clifford Geertz have become overly
familiar to us today, and some of his most felicitous turns of phrase have become
cliches - nowadays, who doesn't claim to do "thick description"? But in the
1970s, Geertz had a liberating impact on law and society research and encouraged us to see behavior and practice as inseparable from meaning. As he wrote,
the analysis of culture is "not an experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing
9
social expressions on their surface enigmatical."
Reading Geertz and other interpretivist theorists and responding to the
paradigm shift underway in our field, I identified myself with a group of
LSA scholars who struggled against the constraints of the conventional ·
dispute-processing framework. I tried to ask different kinds of questions about
the community where I had conducte d my fieldwork. What was the meaning
of the narratives offered by the longtime residents of Sander County? Why
were they so often filled with anguish, anxiety, and loss? Why were the
interviewees so concerne d about the problem of litigiousness when law actually played such a negligible role in local injury cases? What were the words
behind the words that the interviewees spoke?
A later draft of the article became my job talk at SUNY Buffalo, and I kept
working on it after I moved to Buffalo in 1981. Once again, the institutional
context proved crucially important. I doubt that any other law school in the
country would have hired me on the basis of that presentation! But the UB law
school, with its unique mix of critical legal scholars and law and society
specialists, stood for something different. It had even hired as its dean a
sociologist, Red Schwartz, who was an LSA founder and president. By the
time I got there, both Red and Marc Galanter had left, but a group of
remarkable colleagues were still determined to challenge traditional legal
and social scientific ideas. Thomas Headrick's deanship was an exciting time,
before the long shadow of the US News and World Report rankings made legal
academics afraid to defy convention. Settling for conventional scholarship in
my new law-school setting almost felt like letting the team down. It was in this
institutional climate that "The Oven Bird's Song" took its final form, in
conversation with my new colleagues - Fred Konefsky, Jim Atleson, Jack
Schlegel, Rob Steinfeld, Guyora Binder, Virginia Leary, and others.
I should add that the title of the article, taken from a Robert Frost poem
about the call of a woodland bird during a time of change and decay, was itself

9

Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973), p. 5·
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a bit unconventional and caused some difficulty. Frost's poem depicted the
bird' s loud and inharmonious song as a response to a post-lapsarian world,
when springtime is long past, "the highway dust is over all," and one is left to
ask "what to make of a diminished thing." This poem seemed an apt expression of the worldview I found in Sander County, where the denunciation of
litigation by longtime residents became part of what I called "a ceremony of
regret" to mourn the loss of "an untainted world that existed nowhere but in
their imaginations." During the publication process, however, I was told to
change the title, not just because it was unconventional, but also because
potential readers would have no idea what the article was about. I consulted a
number of colleagues, particularly Felice Levine, who had been a close
colleague at the ABF and tends to have excellent judgment about this sort
of thing. Felice thought for a moment and then advised me to keep the title.
"This might be an article," she said, "that people wilL read ten years from now,
and they will see the title as part of its identity." That's why it's still called
"The Oven Bird's Song."

CORE THEMES, PAST AND FUTURE

It is this backward motion toward the source,
Against the stream, that most we see ourselves in,
The tribute of the current to the source.
It is from this in nature we are from.
It is most us.
Robert Frost, 'West-Runnin g Brook"

After publishing "The Oven Bird's Song," I became, in Isaiah Berlin's
terms, a hedgehog not a fox. I found myself returning again and again to the
article's central theme: the radical disparity between "the mythology of
· modern law"'0 and the actual tendency of ·rights holders to avoid lawyers,
frame important issues in non-legal terms, and forgo claims when they
suffered harm. Although law seemed to offer remedies for the problems facing
many residents in Sander County, they viewed legal recourse in injury cases as
a Catch 22. To make a legal claim was to identify themselves as uncultured as outsiders to the community in which they sought acceptance. For those at
the margins who lacked power and were most likely to suffer injustice, this
posed a painful dilemma. Invoking the law seemed to deny them the very
things it purported to offer: dignity, respect, and status.
10

See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modem Law (Routledge, 1992).
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Something similar was true of the men and women with disabilities whom
Frank Munger and I interviewed in the 1990s. Many felt they had been treated
unfairly and excluded, but they also worried that asserting their rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act to gain access to mainstream settings
would simply reaffirm their identities as dependent and abnormal outsiders.
Claiming legal rights took them through the looking glass- the faster they ran
toward social justice, the farther they fell behind. 11
When I returned to Thailand to explore changes in litigation and legal
consciousness a quarter of a century after my initial research there, I expected
to find at least modest growth in the invocation of legal rights among injury
victims. After all, globalization is said to heighten people's awareness of the
rule of law as a resource to redress social wrongs. Much to my surprise,
however, I found that the central theme of "The Oven Bird's Song" - the
avoidance of law and the positive value accorded to "lumping" - was even
more evident than before. In Chiangmai Provincial Court I found fewer tort
cases litigated per injury than was the case in the 1970s. Among injury victims,
a new philosophy of karmic acceptance had replaced a centuries-old view that
village-based wrongs demanded village-based remedies for the good of the
entire community. Litigation now seemed selfish and anti-communitarian.
For an injury victim to mobilize the law was to oppose fundamental cultural
and religious values. Interviewees feared that legal claims would ultimately
work to the disadvantage of the claimant and offer little in return. In short,
economic development had disrupted longstanding customary law traditions,
and "modem" legal institutions had failed to replace them io the minds of
our interviewees.'2
Pursuing the core themes of "The Oven Bird's Song" has thus been a
recurring preoccupation. My latest book, The Myth of the Litigious Society:
Why We Don't Sue,' 3 returns even more explicitly to the questions that
animated "The Oven Bird's Song" and illustrates my current perspective on
tort law, culture, and legal consciousness in contemporary American society.
Ample research over the past three decades has documented again and again
that the vast majority of injury victims never make a claim of any kind against
those who harm them. When injured, only a tiny percentage of Americans
consult lawyers, file lawsuits, or even approach the injurers or their insurance
11

David M. Engel and Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories
of Americans with Disabilities (University of Chicago Press, 2003).
" David M. Engel and Jaruwan S. Engel, Tort, Custom, and Kanna: Globalization and Legal
Consciousness in Thailand (Stanford University Press, 2010).
' 3 David M. Engel, The Myth of the Litigious Society: Why We Don't Sue (University of Chicago
Press, 2016).
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companies extrajudicially to request compensation. Lumping as default in
injury cases has been confirmed in so many studies that its predominance
is beyond dispute - although this fact conflicts directly with what most
Americans believe about their own supposedly litigious society. In fact, most
injury victims - more than 90 percent, at a conservative estimate - simply
absorb the sometimes devastating costs and consequences of their mishaps and
rely on their own resources, on friends and family, or on government benefits.
But what we don't understand very well is why lumping is the predominant
response to injuries in American society. My new book offers the results of a
broad-ranging search for answers, not only in the law and society literature,
but also in books and journal articles from rehabilitation science, nursing,
anesthesiology, neuroscience, psychology, behavioral economics, anthropology, cultural studies, and other disciplines that study injury and pain, mind
and body, human decision-making, law, and culture. These findings can be
summarized in four general explanations of the tendency to lump injuries.
First, many injury victims are actively coping with trauma and pain, which
disrupts their ability to make rational choices about the value of pursuing a
claim as compared to lumping. Injury victims are not cool and dispassionate
rational actors, pausing in the aisle of a grocery store to choose between two
different brands of toothpaste. Physical injuries are exhausting and debilitating. It becomes difficult to think clearly. Injuries' effects and treatment including the use of powerful pain medications - can lead to social isolation
and confusion. Furthermore, as Elaine Scarry has made clear, pain is difficult
to communicate. 14 The person in pain feels he or she has entered a new world
impossible to describe to others. Injuries quite literally impair the use of
language and thus make it exceedingly difficult to voice a claim. "Physical
pain," Scarry writes, "does not simply resist language but actively destroys it."' 5
Cognitive scientists tell us that "we think with our bodies," not just with our
brains.' 6 But what happens when the bodies with which we think are damaged
and in agony? Pain promotes lumping because it obstructs rational decisionmaking and makes it difficult to articulate and pursue a remedy.
Second, researchers in many disciplines have discovered that people who
suffer pain and trauma have a baffling tendency to blame themselves above all
else. They believe that somehow they must have caused their own misfortune,
through carelessness or through some moral failure. Pain is punishme nt- not
Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (Oxford University
Press, 1985).
' 5 Ibid, 4·
' 6 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), p. 51.
'4
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just etymologically ("pain" derives from the Latin poena, meaning punishment)
but also psychologically and even theologically. Victims are not the only ones
who feel intuitively that injuries must be their own fault; studies show that
outside observers have the same perception. They tend to think that if
someone has experienced injury, disability, or disfigurement, that person must
somehow have deserved it. It follows that blaming the victim becomes a
reason not to blame the injurer, no matter how culpable he or she may have
been. The claimant's supposed responsibility for the harm displaces and
preempts the injurer's responsibility. Lumping becomes the only appropriate
response, even if the victim is only partly at fault- and even if tort law doctrine
would allocate some of the blame to both parties.
Third, cultural practices and framing make many injuries appear "natural'~
even when they can be foreseen and easily prevented. Injuries are not objective facts; they are social constructs. Our culturally conditioned perceptions of
injuries can make them appear a normal part of life and not at all an
appropriate occasion for bringing a claim against anyone. For example, it
took quite a while for people to see anything wrong with cars that lacked seat
belts and air bags, since it seemed natural for passengers in a violent collision
to be thrown from the car or through the windshield. And it is only in the past
few years that people have begun to view vehicles without rearview cameras as
defective, despite the thousands of children who were killed or injured each
year by cars backing up. As Sarah Lochlann Jain has observed, every product,
every activity, is encoded with a certain quantum of acceptable injury. 17 But
those codes are not necessarily legible to injury victims or to others. The
suffering of individual victims appears inevitable until a consensus develops
that their injuries are worth avoiding by the adoption of different, safer ways of
doing things. Moreover, the machinery of cultural production that constructs
injuries as natural or unnatural is more accessible to the Haves than the HaveNots, for all the reasons Marc Galanter first explained in "Why the Haves
Come Out Ahead.m 8 Repeat players and potential tort defendants have a
much greater capacity to persuade the public that injuries are unavoidable.
When an injury is naturalized, lumping by the victim appears to many
Americans to be the only sensible response, and claiming appears absurd.
Fourth, the infrequency of claims also results from the social stigma that
attaches to those who challenge their injurers directly. Tort litigation has
acquired a very bad name, and tort litigants are belittled. Social stereotypes
'7

'
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portray injury claimants and their lawyers as greedy, whining, dishonest, and
dishonorable. Think of Saul Goodman in Breaking Bad, who keeps a box of
neck braces in his office to help his clients exaggerate (or fabricate) their
injuries. Think ofWalter Matthau as lawyer "Whiplash Willie" in The Fortune
Cookie, encouraging Jack Lemmon to fake partial paralysis after a Cleveland
Browns football player runs over him at a game. Longstanding negative images
of tort plaintiffs and their lawyers have been magnified by a highly effective PR
campaign waged by tort reform advocates since the 198os with ample funding
from tobacco companies, other large corporations, and insurance companies.
William Haltom and Michael McCann have documente d how the tort
reform campaign permeated the mass media and shaped societal understandings of tort litigation.' 9 Our culture is saturated with negative perceptions of
injury victims who bring claims. These stereotypes influence potential claimants as well as the family and friends who advise them. Lumping is the
predictable result in a culture that stigmatizes people who bring claims instead
of the people who cause them harm.
These are the explanations for lumping that I offer in my latest book. My
interest in the problem has roots extending back to "The Oven Bird's Song."
Since my article was published in 1984, we have learned that Sander County
was not a unique cultural throwback or a quaint rural exception to the general
rule of American litigiousness. Sander County spoke more broadly to American culture and to our legal consciousness as a society - a point that Carol
Greenhous e, Barbara Yngvesson, and I tried to make in our combined study of
communities in three different parts of the country, whose residents shared an
aversion to litigation and explained their reasons in similar words.
Despite the obvious continuities between "The Oven Bird's Song" and my
latest book, there are some differences that reflect changes in the field and in
my own thinking about the problem of legal culture and consciousness. For
example, the first explanation oflumping described above- the alienating and
'disabling effects of trauma on potential claimants - was not apparent to me
thirty years ago. Indeed, I taught torts and wrote about legal consciousness for
many years without properly appreciating the significance of the fact that tort
plaintiffs tended to be persons in physical pain. Even worse, after conducting
research among persons with disabilities, I utterly failed to put two and two
together and recognize that disability was a common result of tortious injuries.
A number of the people with disabilities whom Frank Munger and
I interviewed in the 1990s were former injury victims. Their ambivalence
•9
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about law was very closely connected to the ambivalence I had previously
encountered in Sander County, although I didn't see the relationship at
the time.
On the other hand, the second explanation for lumping - victim-blaming
and self-blame - was at least partially apparent to me at the time of my Sander
County research. As described in "The OvenBird's Song," when I told one of
the community observers about the little girl in Sander County who had been
seriously harmed by an "attractive nuisance," he rather coldly blamed the
child by commenting that he would "figure that the kid ought to be sharp
enough to stay away" from the hazard.'0 And sure enough, the mother in that
case eventually came around to the view that she herself was to blame for not
watching her daughter closely enough. I was not prepared at that point to·
generalize about the significance of self-blaming and victim-blaming, but in
my new book, drawing on additional research from a variety of disciplines,
I was ready to conclude that blaming the victim is one of the most powerful
explanations for lumping in injury cases.
The third explanation for lumping- the naturalization of injury- was also
partially evident to me at the time of "The Oven Bird's Song." From my
discussions with farming families, I learned that these stoic and admirable
oldtimers considered injuries a part of life. Farming was hard work, and it
involved dangerous machinery. Injuries and pain were familiar hazards,
though risks could be reduced if one was careful (again, the importance of
self-blame!). But it was "normal" to experience painful accidents, and what
was "abnormal" was to view those mishaps as potential windfalls and to
convert them into demands for compensation from someone else. As I wrote
in "The Oven Bird's Song," "money was viewed as something one acquired
through long hours of hard work, not by exhibiting one's misfortunes to a
judge or jury or other third party, even when the injuries were clearly caused
by the wrongful behavior of another." 2 ' Unless injuries were perceived as an
exception, as contrary to the natural order, they would not be viewed as an
occasion to assert a claim. My new book presents numerous examples of the
naturalization of injury, but the original insight is rooted in my experience in
Sander County.
The fourth explanation for lumping - the stigmatization of claiming in a
culture that disvalues tort litigation - owes everything to my research in
Sander County. The light bulb that went on as I was reading Geertz while
struggling to write "The OvenBird's Song" was the realization that so-called
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Afterword
American litigiousness was not an objective fact but a symbolically important
myth. This was the meaning of the song that the oven bird sang - it expressed
nostalgia for an imagined world before the economy shifted away from
agriculture, before "strangers" entered the community, before racial and
ethnic diversity became visible on the main street of the town. It extolled
lumping because claiming was a sign of cultural decline.
Surely this deep connection between the myth of litigiousness and the
resentment of a modern, globalized, multicultural society is even more evident today than it was thirty years ago in rural Illinois. Today, the discourse of
social decay is everywhere. The stigmatization of tort claimants makes injury
victims even more fearful of demanding their rights. In Sander County, the
norms opposing tort claims created a symbolic wall to separate insiders from
outsiders in a changing community. Today, the call for moral rectitude has
taken on even greater urgency in the face of social changes many Americans
find confusing and threatening. One might think that moral rectitude would
mean·invoking the law and conforming to it, but for personal injury victims it
means just the opposite. The morally upright person is one who abstains. He
or she refuses to mobilize the law when injured by another. The paradox is
compounded when we realize that people who oppose invoking the law
against tort defendants tend to be the same people who applaud using the
law against criminal defendants who injure others. Using the law to sanction
injurious behavior is not in itself a signifier of moral depravity or societal
decline; it is the use of law by the wrong people against the wrong defendants
in the wrong kinds of cases. Those whose lives are transformed by pain and
trauma are told to endure their misfortune and not to challenge those who
harm them. In 2016 there is much less tort litigation in state courts and more
lumping than there was thirty years ago, when "The Oven Bird's Song" was
published. In this sense, America has become Sander County writ large.
The question remains as important and complex as ever- can or should the
law play a role when pain disrupts the relationship between self and community? Pain isolates its victims from society, it destroys their relationships with
others and their ability to communicat e, and too often it leaves them destitute
or with a greatly reduced capacity to earn and to thrive. And the pain of
accidental injuries does not fall equally on the rich and the poor alike.
Statistically speaking, risk flows down the social hierarchy and pools among
the least privileged. Have-nots are exposed to more accidental injuries than
the haves, yet they· are the ones least able to bear the after-effects of serious
harm. What a terrible irony, then, that the effort to seek a legal remedy
frequently reinforces the injury victim's identity as socially marginal, as inferior, and as culturally alien. It remains an urgent task for law and society
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scholars to understand the cultural meaning and social consequences of
painful and damaged bodies - for individuals, for entire communities, and
for justice.
Research on tort law and society has advanced considerably in the past
thirty years, but there is so much left to discover. My research growing out of
"The Oven Bird's Song" has focused primarily on physical injuries, despite
our growing recognition of non-physical harms to reputation, privacy, and
emotional well-being. In my next project, I hope to remedy this shortcoming,
but other law and society scholars are already leading the way. 22 It is always
useful and gratifying to revisit the past, but the future of law and society
scholarship is full of promise, as exemplified by the scholars who have
contributed to this volume. Law and society researchers will continue to
explore the most important sociolegal myths that prevail in our society. But,
equally important, they will expand our theories about law and deepen our
understanding of when and how law actually matters. What is true of tort law
is equally true of other fields - the human side has been largely neglected in
favor of explicating theories and rules that often have little practical relevance
to the ind,ividuals whom law is meant to serve. If it is true that the vast
majority of injury victims simply lump their misfortunes, if they never bring
a claim of any kind against their injurers, then we must reconsider both the
value and the efficacy of a great deal of tort law doctrine. Law and society
research at its best forces us to question the obvious, to reassess prevailing
legal practices in the light of actual behavior, and to remember that the law
concerns real human actors, not fictional beings such as the reasonable
person or the rational actor.
Too seldom do we hear the real voices of injury victims. What do pain and
trauma mean for their lives? What are their anxieties, feelings, and concerns?
How do power relationships affect the risks they face and their responses to
harm when it occurs? I am confident that the next generation of law and
society scholars will continue to take full advantage of the countless opportunities for research on injuries and on other pressing issues relevant to law in the
lives of ordinary people. In the last analysis, "The Oven Bird's Song" was no
more than a single response to this wealth of topics awaiting the attention of
law and society researchers. It was shaped by the inspiring work of contemporaries and forebears and it was given meaning by the scores of imaginative
studies that followed. It offered the portrait of a community, but it was also the
product of a community of colleagues to whom I remain forever grateful.
" See, for example, Samantha Barbas, Laws o{Image: Privacy and Publicity in America (Stanford
University Press, 2015).

